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No Way Out? The Question of Unilateral Withdrawals
or Referrals to the ICC and Other Human Rights Courts
Michael P. Scharf * and Patrick Dowd

**

'Relax, "said the night man. 'Weareprogrammedto receive.
You can check out any timeyou like, butyou can never leave!"
The Eagles, Hotel California,Asylum Records, 1976
I. INTRODUCTION
The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") entered into
force on July 1, 2002.1 Today, 108 states are party to the Court's Statute.2 One of
the ways cases come before the Court is through referrals of the states parties.
The ICC has received and accepted a total of four referrals of "situations" to
date, three of which have been "self-referrals," where the state party on or in
whose territory the alleged crimes have occurred or are occurring referred the
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situation to the ICC.3 The drafters of the Rome Statute assumed that no state
party would ever actually self-refer,4 despite technically providing for such action
in the Rome Statute, 5 and a current situation has presented the Court with a
second unexpected twist: President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, having made
the first-ever state party referral to the ICC in the name of Uganda in December
2003,6 suddenly announced in November 2004 that Uganda might "withdraw"
its case from the ICC, in order to make peace with the rebel Lord's Resistance
Army ("LRA").7
The Rome Statute, however, does not appear to provide for such a
withdrawal. By now, the ICC and its Chief Prosecutor have invested substantial
resources over the past four years investigating and preparing the case for trial.
Two distinguished commentators have noted that "[a] withdrawal in these
circumstances would incur a considerable loss of credibility for the Court and
would... represent a defeat for the policy against impunity, the principle that
animates the very idea of the Court."8
This Article addresses the consequent issue: What if a state, self-referring or
referring the situation in another country, changes its mind and attempts to
"withdraw" its ICC referral? What is the role and appropriate response of the
ICC at that point? This issue becomes especially relevant and pressing as events
in Uganda unfold and the possibility looms of an attempted "withdrawal" of
Uganda's referral. This Article examines the Rome Statute, the drafting history,
and the expert commentaries, together with the statutory and case law of the
other major human rights courts and bodies, and the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention"), in an effort to provide a comprehensive
analysis of whether a state party can lawfully withdraw a referral from the ICC.
To set the stage, it first examines the self-referral phenomenon and explores the
reasons why attempted withdrawal of self-referrals is likely to arise.

3
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6

See International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, available online at <http://www.icccpi.int/cases.html> (visited Dec 5,2008) (the fourth was the Security Council's referral of the
Darfur situation).
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal
Court, 99 Am J Ind L 385, 386-387 (2005).
ICC Statute, art 14(1) ("A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or
more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed ... .
ICC Press Release, Presidentof Uganda Refers Situation concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the
ICC, ICC-20040129-44-En (Jan 29, 2004), available online at
pressrelease.details&id= 16&1=en.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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II. BACKGROUND

A.

CURRENT REFERRALS BEFORE THE ICC

In December 2003, Ugandan President Museveni "took the decision to refer
the situation concerning the Lord's Resistance Army to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court,"9 marking the first-ever state party referral to the
fledgling ICC of a situation occurring on a state party's own territory. President
Museveni sought a new option for ending the horrors inflicted upon the people
of northern Uganda after twenty-plus years of civil war with the rebel LRA and
faced with "persistent international indifference coupled with the exhaustion of
available alternatives."' 10 After the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
officially opened an investigation into the situation, however, President
Museveni unexpectedly announced in November 2004 that Uganda might
"withdraw its case" from the ICC, having recently negotiated a partial ceasefire
and the framework for a peace settlement with the LRA leaders."
Museveni's claim drew immediate outcry from human rights groups and the
international community. Amnesty International quickly noted that
There is not a scrap of evidence in the drafting history or in commentaries by
leading international law experts on the Rome Statute suggesting that once a
state party has referred a situation that it can "withdraw" the referral. As soon
as the situation has been
referred, the ICC has jurisdiction and the state cannot
12
"withdraw" its referral.

While this claim seems logical, given the absence of any clear language in the
Rome Statute regarding withdrawal of a referral, Amnesty International did not
provide any detailed analysis to support its conclusion. Since these events, no
other careful scrutiny of the issue of withdrawal has emerged, and the
Prosecutor has since issued warrants for the top five LRA leaders. 3 However,
the LRA leaders have seized upon Museveni's statement and repeatedly insisted
9
10
11

12

13

ICC Press Release, Presidentof Uganda Refers Situation, ICC-20040129-44-En (cited in note 6).
Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral to the
InternationalCriminalCourt,99 Am J Ind L 403, 410 (2005).
ICC May Drop LRA Charges, New Vision (cited in note 7). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The
ICC-Quo Vadis?, 4 J Intl Crim Just 421, 424 (2006) (suggesting that President Museveni's
statement itself is "tantamount to a withdrawal of the referral").
Amnesty International Press Release, Uganda: Government Cannot Prevent the InternationalCriminal
Court from Investigating Crimes 2 (Nov 16, 2004), available online at <http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/ info/AFR59/008/2004> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
Samuel Okiror Egadu, Museveni Wants LRA Warrants-ForNow, Institute for War & Peace
Reporting AR No 123 (July 25, 2007), available online at <http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=
f&o=337394&apc._ state=henfacr337405> (visited Dec 5, 2008). Two of the five LRA indictees
have allegedly since been killed. See Asuman Bisika, LRA Case to Determine Fate of ICC, New
Vision (Mar 16, 2008).
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that they will not consent to any peace settlement until the referral is withdrawn
and the ICC warrants are dropped.' 4 President Museveni therefore can claim the
dubious distinction of having created the current confusion over withdrawal of a
referral, which has imperiled the entire ICC referral procedure.
Three other referrals have been made to the ICC subsequent to the initial
Ugandan referral. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central
African Republic each also referred situations occurring within their own
territory, in April 2004"5 and January 2005,16 respectively. Additionally, the UN
Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC in March
2005.1'
Finally, the Ivory Coast made the first-ever non-state party provisional
declaration to the ICC in February 2005.18 The Ivory Coast signed the Rome
Statute soon after it was opened for signature in 1998 but has never
subsequently ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the Statute.19
B. THE BASIC REFERRAL PROCEDURE
The Rome Statute outlines a basic procedure for a state to refer a situation
to the Prosecutor of the ICC. The Statute makes clear that only a state party (or
the UN Security Council) may refer a situation. 0 A state party is one that signed
the Rome Statute prior to December 31, 2000 and has subsequently ratified,
14

Henry Mukasa, Uganda Explains Government Line on ICC, New Vision (Oct 11, 2006); Paul Harera

is

and Emmanuel Gyezaho, LRA's Oti Vows to Kill ICC Captors, Monitor (Uganda) (Oct 13, 2006);
Rebel Leader Vows War over Indictments, New Vision (May 25, 2007); Egadu, Museveni Wants LRA
Warrantsfor Now, Institute for War & Peace Reporting AR No 123 (cited in note 13); Samuel
Okiror Egadu, Kampala Rules Out Blanket Amnesty for LRA, Institute for War & Peace Reporting
AR No 137 (Oct 8, 2007), available online at <http://www.iwpr.net/?s=f&o=339680&p
=acr&J=EN&apc-state=henaBlanket%20Amnesty/o20for%20LRA-l> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
ICC Press Release, ProsecutorReceives Referral of the Situation in the Democraic Republic of Congo, ICC-

16

OTP-20040419-50-En (Apr 19, 2004), available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/
pressreleases/19.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
ICC Press Release, ProsecutorReceives Referral concerning CentralAfrican Republic, ICC-OTP-20050107-

17

86-En (Jan 7, 2005), available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/ pressreleases/87.html>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
UN Security Council Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Dafur,Sudan, to Prosecutor of

1

International Criminal Court, SC/8351 (Mar 31, 2005), available online at <http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
ICC Press Release, Registrar Confirms that the Republic of Cdte d'Ivoire Has Accepted the Jurisdiction of the

19

Court, ICC-20050215-91-En
(Feb 15, 2005), available online at <http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/93.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
Id. See also Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Regional and County Info: Ivory Coast

20

(May 23, 2007), available online at <http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&iduct=84>
Dec 5, 2008).
ICC Statute, arts 13(a)-(b), 14.
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accepted, or approved the Statute, or one that has otherwise acceded to the
Statute since December 31, 2000.21 By definition, a state party "accepts the
'
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5, 12
namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.2 3 A state
party may thereafter "refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed, ' 2 4 in
writing,25 so that the Prosecutor may subsequently investigate the situation and
charge specific individuals with those crimes. The Court may then exercise its
jurisdiction specifically over that situation. 26 The referral procedure therefore has
three steps: first, a state becomes a party to the Rome Statute and accepts the
Court's general jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes; second, a state refers a
specific situation to the Court and "triggers" the Court's jurisdiction; and third,
the Court exercises its jurisdiction.
The Rome Statute provides a number of options for delay, deferral, and
termination of an investigation or prosecution once a referral has been made.
For example, the UN Security Council can delay or suspend an investigation or
prosecution indefinitely under Article 16.27 Articles 17 through 19 establish a
broad platform for determining admissibility and jurisdiction for a given case.
Not only can an interested state 28 or an accused 29 challenge admissibility or
jurisdiction based on various criteria, but the Court itself can also voluntarily
question the admissibility of a case 30 and must "satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction
in any case brought before it."'" The Prosecutor can defer an investigation in
light of admissibility issues under these articles. Article 53 provides that the

21
22
23

Id, art 125.
Id, art 12(1).
Id, art 5(1).

26

Id, art 14.
International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the InternationalCriminalCourt Rule 45
(Sept 3-10, 2002), available online at <www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjoumal/Rules of_
Proc and Evid_070704-EN.pdf'> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
ICC Statute, art 13.

27

Id, art 16, stating that

28

No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the
Council under the same conditions.
See generally id, arts 18-19.

29

See generally id, art 19.

24
25

30

Id, art 19(1) ("The Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case .

31

Id.
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Prosecutor may decline to prosecute following an investigation and that he may
reconsider a decision to investigate or prosecute a case.32 He also may amend or
withdraw charges against an individual pursuant to Article 61. The Statute
generally contains flexibility in favor of states in light of "exceptional36
' 3
circumstances,"3' "change of circumstances, 5 and "new facts or information.,
Each of these options represents a procedural check on the power of the Court
that could conceivably be leveraged by any interested and determined party.37
States not party to the ICC may not make referrals. 38 Rather, those states
may make ad hoc declarations accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over the Rome
Statute's crimes without actually becoming a state party,39 thereby allowing the
Prosecutor to initiate investigations related to situations in their territory at his
discretion using his Article 15 proprio motu privileges.4 ° Although the drafters of
the Statute may have intended the Court to interpret these declarations "in the
sense of 'situation in question,"' 41 they arguably did not mean for the Court to

32

33
34

Id, art 53.
Id, art 61.
Id, art 19(4) ("In exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge (of
admissibility) to be brought more than once or at a time later than the commencement of the

trial.").
35

36

Id, art 18(7) ("A State... may challenge the admissibility of a case under article 19 on the grounds
of additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances."). A "change of
circumstances" can also work against a state. See art 18(3) ("The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's
investigation shall be open to review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at
any time when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's
unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.').
Id, art 53(4) ("The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an
investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.').

37

38

On the other hand, one ICC analyst has noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber has no power to
restrain the Prosecutor "once the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements have been
satisfied." The Prosecutor's discretion is his only control at that point. "Although there are
institutional checks on the power of the Prosecutor... bureaucratic realities provide no
procedural boundaries to check--or assist-his decision to prosecute when the 'interests of
justice' are in question."J. Alex Little, BalancingAccountabiliyand Victim Autonomy at the International
CriminalCourt, 38 Georgetown J Inti L 363, 379 (2007).
Sharon Williams, Article 13: Exercise of Jurisdiction, in Triffterer, ed, Commentagy on the Rome Statute T
15 (cited in note 40); Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal
Court: Observers;Notes, Article by Article, 15 (Nomos 1999).

39
40

41

ICC Statute, art 12(3).
Id, arts 12(2), 15; Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M. El Zeidy, and Hector Olasolo, The International
CriminalCourt'sAd Hoe Jurisdiction Revisited, 99 Am J Intl L 421, 426 (2005).
Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and
John R.W.D. Jones, eds, 1 The Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt.A Commentagy 583, 611
(Oxford 2002).
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treat an acceptance of such declarations as analogous to a state party referral.42
Several expert observers have noted:
To treat a declaration under Article 12(3) in the same way as a referral would
grant third states a privilege that was reserved to states parties to the Statute.
Article 14 limits the possibility of referrals expressly to states parties, and the
article's drafting history confirms that this limitation was intended. 4u
Otherwise, non-states parties could take advantage of the powers and
resources of the ICC "without sharing the burdens and obligations assumed by
states parties, such as budgetary contributions and duties of cooperation."' Due
to this inability of non-states parties to make formal referrals, this Article does
not directly address the issues involved in a non-states party declaration.
This Article also does not specifically address issues concerning the Security
Council's referrals to the ICC. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides the
Security Council with the power to indefinitely defer the investigation or
prosecution of any case; 4 therefore, the question of whether the Security
Council may withdraw a referral is effectively moot since it can accomplish the
same end through Article 16. Where relevant, however, conclusions that relate
to Security Council referrals as well as state referrals are noted.
C. THE SELF-REFERRAL PHENOMENON
The factual background to the withdrawal issue necessarily includes the fact
that "self-referrals" are themselves something of an unexpected phenomenon.
As Mahnoush Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman, two expert commentators on
the ICC, have observed:
Before and during the Rome negotiations, no one-neither states that were
initially skeptical about the viability of an international criminal court nor states
that supported it-assumed that governments would want to invite the future
court to investigate and prosecute crimes that had occurred in their territory. To
the contrary, it was assumed that the Court would become involved only in
those states that were unwilling or refused to prosecute, staged a sham
prosecution of their governmental cronies, or were simply unable to prosecute.
There is no indication that the drafters ever contemplated that the Statute
would include voluntary state referrals to the Court of difficult cases arising in
their own territory. By voluntary referral we refer to situations in which the sole
basis for satisfying the Court's admissibility test is the referral-whether

42

Stahn, El Zeidy, and Olasolo, 99 Am J Intl L at 424 (cited in note 40).

43

Id.

44

Id at 425. See also Williams, Article 13: Exercise ofJurisdiction, 3 (cited in note 38) (noting that the
ILC similarly believed that restriction of referrals to states parties would enhance cooperation and

45

encourage ratification).
ICC Statute, art 16.

Winter 2009

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

effected formally or implicitly-by the state in which a crime or the situation
subject to investigation has taken place.46
In other words, the expectation was that states parties would refer only
situations occurring in other states.
The first (and current) ICC Prosecutor altered this expectation upon
accepting his position at the Court. The Prosecutor issued an important policy
paper in September 2003 in which he outlined some principles and goals of the
Office of the Prosecutor ("OTP"), as well as some basic organizational issuessort of a "State of the OTP" address.47 He made two particularly noteworthy
remarks in this paper, for the purposes of this discussion. First, he declared his
intention for the OTP to "function with a two-tiered approach to combat
impunity," in which his office would pursue leaders "who bear most
responsibility for the crimes" while encouraging "national prosecutions, where
possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators."48 Second, in keeping with a "twotiered approach," he stated that, rather than working only on potentially
adversarial situations where a state is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate
or prosecute,
there is no impediment to the admissibility of a case before the Court where no
State has initiated any investigation. There may be cases where inaction by
States is the appropriate course of action. For example, the Court and a
territorial State incapacitated by mass crimes may agree that a consensual
division of labour is the most logical and effective approach.4 9

The Prosecutor integrated the ideals of complementarity, effective
prosecution, and the "duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes" embodied in the Rome Statute. ° He
essentially declared his intention and desire to work with states parties, and not
against them.
The Prosecutor's policy declaration had three tangible effects. First, the
policy paper itself highlighted the Prosecutor's dynamic and innovative approach
to applying and interpreting the Rome Statute, especially in light of the
ambiguities built into the Statute"1 and the lack of adjudicative history at the ICC

46

Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 AmJ Intl L at 386-387 (cited in note 4).

47

Office of the Prosecutor (International Criminal Court), Paperon Some Polio7
Issues before the Office of
the Prosecutor (Sept 2003), available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905
_PolicyPaper.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).

48

Id at 3.
Id at 5.

49

50 ICC Statute, preamble.
51
A surprising number of Rome Statute article and draft history discussions conclude with some
version of the observation that the drafters "failed to solve the problem and decided to leave it
for the Court to resolve." Stahn, El Zeidy, and Olasolo, 99 Am J Intl L at 429 (cited in note 40)
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to date. The drafters of the Rome Statute apparently left the possibility of selfreferral or waiver of complementarity to the Court's interpretation, 2 and the
Prosecutor gave the question some definition. Arsanjani and Reisman
53
characterize this as "the law-in-action of the International Criminal Court.
Second, the Prosecutor has in fact worked closely with states parties, and he
succeeded in obtaining the first three referrals to the ICC as self-referrals. He
has noted that he worked especially with both Uganda and Congo to encourage
those states to self-refer their situations.5 4 This seemingly cooperative
achievement has a potential dark side, however. This cooperation amounts to
something of a hybrid between the power of self-referral and the Prosecutor's
proprio motu powers under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 5 As such, it could be
seen as an unwarranted circumvention by the Prosecutor of the authorization he
is required to obtain from the pre-Trial Chamber to start an investigation proprio
motu under Article 15 5' and an abuse of the automatic investigation mandated by
a state party referral under Article 53 .7 The Prosecutor must therefore take care
that this process of encouraged self-referral occurs transparently and by the
book.
Third, however, the self-referral phenomenon has itself generated the
current confusion over whether a state party can withdraw a referral.

52

(discussing the Court's temporal jurisdiction). See also Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Ugandan
Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementaity Prindple:An Assessment of the First State's Party
Referral to the ICC, 5 Intl Crim L Rev 83, 100 (2005) (discussing waiver of complementarity and
self-referrals, and noting that "it seems that this issue was left to the Court's interpretation");
Little, 38 Georgetown J Intl L at 365 (cited in note 37) ("[T]he Rome Statute had left open the
question of whether and when the Court should defer to domestic amnesties for such
perpetrators.'). There are numerous other examples, especially in the draft history materials.
Little's explanation for this is that "the lack of guidance was intended, at least in part, to provide
the Prosecutor with a wide range of options when faced with admittedly new circumstances." Id
at 379.
El Zeidy, 5 Intl Crim L Rev at 100 (cited in note 51).

53

See Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Ind L at 385 (cited in note 4).

54

Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The InternationalCriminal Court: Seeking GlobalJustice, Address at the Case
Western Reserve University School of Law (Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Lecture
in Global Legal Reform) (Oct 16, 2007), transcript available online at <http://law.case.edu/
centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20071016&type=wmv> (visited Dec 5, 2008).

55

ICC Statute, art 15 ("The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.').
Id, art 15(3) ("If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an
investigation, together with any supporting material collected.').

56

57

Id, art 53(1) ("The Prosecutor shall ... initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that
there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute.'). See generally Paola Gaeta, Is the
Practice of 'Self-Referrals' a Sound Startfor the ICC?, 2 J Ind Crim Just 949 (2004) (discussing in greater
depth this and other "possible pitfalls" of self-referrals and the Prosecutor's policy).
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Theoretically, as the drafters expected, a state party referring a situation in
another state would have little desire to withdraw a referral; any situation grave
enough to warrant a referral would be unlikely to dissipate enough to cause the
referring state to change its mind.5 s Alternatively, the drafters feared that the
ICC would receive only "throwaway" referrals, because "states might abuse such
an option by trying to send frivolous or politically motivated referrals with
regard to situations in the territory of a political adversary,"59 To address such
concerns, the drafters built a screening process into the Rome Statute for the
Prosecutor and a notification process for the referred state.6 ° This notification
process may actually provide the lone avenue for withdrawal for a self-referring
state (discussed further below in Section III.B).
Instead, with the apparent proliferation of self-referrals, the ICC must deal
with the variety of reasons that a state may seek to withdraw its referral. As
Mahnoush Arsanjani and Michael Reisman have observed:
Considering the pressure for resolving disputes through negotiation and the
recognition that some of these disputes are not susceptible to military solutions,
is it not likely that some states that have made voluntary referrals may later
agree, as part of the negotiating process with their adversaries, to withdraw their
referral to the ICC? Grounds for withdrawal ...could be that the state has
"61
decided to use its national judicial system to deal with crimes ....
More drastically, a newly elected government, a government that overthrows
the previous one, or a brand new government taking power in the wake of a
state's fracturing or state succession would be especially likely to try to withdraw
a referral from the ICC.
Whatever the cause, the issue of withdrawal is now unavoidable, and the
evolution of the ICC referral process must be considered as part of the
backdrop to the discussion.

58

Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, Referral by States Parties,in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones, eds,

1

The Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court.A Commentary 619, 624-25 (Oxford 2002) (cited
in note 41).

60

Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Ind L at 387 n 9 (cited in note 4), citing Kirsch and Robinson,
Referral by States Parties, in 1 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentag 619,
622-23 (cited in note 58).
Id; ICC Statute, arts 53 (creating a screening process for the Prosecutor's determination of

61

whether to initiate an investigation) and 18(1) ("[TIhe prosecutor shall notify all States Parties and
those States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.").
Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Intl L at 397 (cited in note 4).

59
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D. THE PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE CONUNDRUM
The Uganda situation is not particularly unique. Notwithstanding the notion
of "no peace without justice" that was popular in the 1990s, achieving peace and
obtaining justice are sometimes incompatible goals-at least in the short term.
In order to end an international or internal conflict, negotiations often must be
held with the very leaders who are responsible for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. When this is the case, insisting on criminal prosecutions can prolong
the conflict, resulting in more deaths, destruction, and human suffering. 2 Thus,
Payam Akhavan, then Legal Adviser to the Office of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, observed a decade
ago: "it is not unusual in the political stage to see the metamorphosis of
yesterday's war monger into today's peace broker."6 3
Reflecting this reality, during the past thirty years, Angola, Argentina, Brazil,
Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast,
Nicaragua, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uruguay have each, as
part of a peace arrangement, granted amnesty to members of the former regime
or insurgency that committed international crimes within their respective
borders.64 With respect to five of these countries-Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti,
Sierra Leone, and South Africa-"the United Nations pushed for, helped
negotiate, and/or endorsed the granting of amnesty as a means of restoring
peace and democratic government.""
In addition to amnesty (which immunizes the perpetrator from domestic
prosecution), exile and asylum in a foreign country (which may put the
perpetrator out of the jurisdictional reach of domestic prosecution) are often
used to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements, with the blessing and
involvement of significant states and the UN. Peace negotiators call this the
"Napoleonic Option," in reference to the treatment of French emperor
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As an anonymous government official stated in an oft-quoted article: "The quest for justice for
yesterday's victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes today's
living the dead of tomorrow." Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negodiations, 18 Hum Rts Q 249,
258 (1996).
Payam Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement and Bgond, 18
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Hum Rts Q 259, 271 (1996).
See Steven R. Ramer, New Democracies, Old Atrocdies: An Inquiy in InternationalLaw, 87 Georgetown
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L J 707, 722-23 (1999) (mentioning a number of transitional democracies that have passed
amnesty laws); Michael P. Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the InteniationalLegal Obligation to
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 Law & Contemp Probs 41, 41 (1996) (discussing these countries'
amnesty programs); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Impuniy and Human Rights in InternationalLaw and Pracice
461 (Oxford 1995) (noting grants of amnesty in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, and El
Salvador).
Scharf, 59 Law & Contemp Probs at 41 (cited in note 64).
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Napoleon Bonaparte who, after his defeat at Waterloo in 1815, was exiled to St.
Helena rather than face trial or execution.66 More recently, a number of dictators
and warlords have been granted sanctuary abroad in return for relinquishing
power. Thus, for example, Ferdinand Marcos fled the Philippines for Hawaii;
Baby Doc Duvalier fled Haiti for France; Mengistu Haile Miriam fled Ethiopia
for Zimbabwe; Idi Amin fled Uganda for Saudi Arabia; General Raoul Cedras
fled Haiti for Panama; and Charles Taylor fled Liberia for exile in Nigeria-a
deal negotiated by the US and UN envoy Jacques Klein.67
Except in cases involving a treaty that requires prosecution,68 such amnesty
and exile deals are not inconsistent with international law. This conclusion finds
support in the observations of the 2004 Report of the International Truth and
Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone:
The Commission is unable to condemn the resort to amnesty by those who
negotiated the Lom6 Peace Agreement [which provides amnesty to persons
who committed crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone]. The explanations
given by the Government negotiators, including in their testimonies before the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are compelling in this respect. In all
good faith, they believed that the RUF [insurgents] would not agree to end
hostilities if the Agreement were not accompanied by a form of pardon or
amnesty ....
The Commission is unable to declare that it considers amnesty too
high a price to pay for the delivery of peace to Sierra Leone, under the
circumstances that prevailed in July 1999. It is true that the Lom6 Agreement
did not immediately return the country to peacetime. Yet it provided the
framework for a process that pacified the combatants and, five years later, has
returned Sierra Leoneans to a context in which they need not fear daily violence
69
and atrocity.

It is a common misconception that trading amnesty or exile for peace is
equivalent to the absence of accountability and redress.7" Amnesties and exile
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67

68
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Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Juslice: The Stoty Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since
Nuremberg 5 (Carolina 1997).
See Dave Gilson, The Exile Files, 2003, Mother Jones (Aug 21, 2003), available online at
<http://www.motherjones.com/news/update/2003/08/we_532_0l.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008)
(discussing the exile arrangements of more than a dozen individuals).
For example, an amnesty or exile deal would be incompatible with the duty to prosecute or
extradite found in the Genocide Convention, the Grave Breaches provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, and the Torture Convention. See Michael P. Scharf, From the eXile Files:An Essay on
TradingJusicefor Peace, 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 339, 350-66 (2006).
William A. Schabas, Amnesy, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court
for SierraLeone, 11 UC Davis J Intl L & Poly 145, 163-64 (2004). Schabas, the Director of the Irish
Centre for Human Rights, was a member of the International Truth Commission for Sierra
Leone.
See William W. Burke-White, Refraining Impunity: Appying Liberal International Law Theory to an
Anaysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 Harv Int LJ 467, 482-518 (2001) (classifying amnesties into four
categories, from least to most legitimate: (1)"Blanket Amnesty"; (2) "Locally Legitimized, Partial
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deals can be tied to accountability mechanisms that are less invasive than
domestic or international prosecution. Ever more frequently in the aftermath of
an amnesty- or exile-for-peace deal, the concerned governments have made
monetary reparations to the victims and their families, established truth
commissions to document the abuses (and sometimes identify perpetrators by
name), and have instituted employment bans and purges (referred to as
"lustration") that keep such perpetrators from positions of public trust.7"
Another approach that is in vogue is the utilization of informal tribal-justice
mechanisms, such as Rwanda's "Gacaca" process. 2 While not the same as a fullscale criminal prosecution (and hence falling outside the ICC's concept of
"complementarity" 7 ), these mechanisms do encompass much of what justice is
intended to accomplish: prevention, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation.
Indeed, some experts believe that these mechanisms do not just constitute "a
second-best approach" when prosecution is impracticable, but that in many
situations they may be better suited to achieving the aims of justice.74
Consequently, during the negotiations for the Rome Statute creating the
ICC, the US and a few other delegations expressed concern that the ICC would
hamper efforts to halt human rights violations and restore peace and democracy
in places like Haiti and South Africa. 71 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
responded that it would be "inconceivable" for the ICC to undermine an
amnesty-for-peace arrangement by pursuing prosecution in a situation like South
Africa.76 According to the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference,
Philippe Kirsch of Canada, the issue was not definitively resolved during the
Diplomatic Conference. Rather, the provisions that were adopted reflect
"creative ambiguity" that could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of
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Immunity"; (3) "Internationally Legitimized, Partial Immunity"; and
Constitutional Immunity").
Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human Rights at 282-91 (cited in note 64).
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Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and InternationalLaw at 85-99 (Cambridge 2007).

73

74

75

76

(4) "International

The "complementarity provision," Article 17 (I)(a) of the Rome Statute, requires the court to
dismiss a case where "[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation
or prosecution."
See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Fo'giveness:FacingHistog after Genocide and Mass Violence 9
(Beacon 1998) (contending that prosecutions "are slow, partial, and narrow").
See US Delegation Draft: State Practice regarding Amnesties and Pardons 1 (Aug 17, 1997), available
online at <www.iccnow.org/documents/USDraftonAmnestiesPardons.pdf>
(visited Dec 5,
2008) ("The U.S. delegation has raised the difficult matter of how to address amnesties and
pardons in the context of a statute for an international criminal court.").
Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International
CriminalCourt, 14 Eur J Intl L 482 n 5 (2003) (quoting a Sept 1, 1998 speech by Kofi Annan at the
Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony).
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the ICC to interpret the Rome Statute as permitting recognition of an amnesty
or asylum exception to the jurisdiction of the court.77 Should such creative
ambiguity be read as permitting a state to withdraw a referral in order to pursue
an amnesty or exile for peace deal?
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE TEXT OF THE ROME STATUTE
The Rome Statute does not expressly provide for withdrawal of a state party
referral anywhere, either on its face or under more nuanced scrutiny. The glaring
absence of such a provision, taken together with the abundance of other
procedural safeguards available to both the state party and the Prosecutor,
strongly suggests that the Statute simply does not allow a referral to be
withdrawn. Rather, the Statute as a whole conveys the impression that once a
referral has been made and the Court has exercised its jurisdiction, control and
power over the referral lies entirely in the hands of the Court.
The Statute itself makes reference to withdrawal in only four of its 128
articles, and only three of these references directly concern states parties. Article
127 deals exclusively with withdrawal from the Rome Statute as a whole and
provides the best context for the Statute's treatment of the concept of
"withdrawal." Article 127 states in full:
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take
effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the
notification specifies a later date.
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the
obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including
any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect
any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate
and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became
effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any
matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on
which the withdrawal became effective.
Taken as a whole, Article 127 affirms the sovereign right of a state to
withdraw from the ICC as with any other treaty, yet binds a withdrawing state to
its existing obligations under the ICC. The one-year notice allows the Court
ample time to take under consideration any relevant matter and to thwart a state
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The author discussed this issue with Philippe Kirsch over dinner during an international
conference in Strasbourg, France, on Nov 19, 1998. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnes~y Exception to the

Jurisdictionof the InternationalCriminalCourt,32 Cornell Ind L J 507, 522 n 104 (1999).
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party seeking to evade responsibility for crimes not yet connected "with criminal
investigations and proceedings" by withdrawing. Moreover, Article 127 provides
unambiguous notice to states that they will be held to their obligations once they
sign on to the ICC.
The mere existence of the general withdrawal clause in Article 127 is itself
evidence that the Statute does not explicitly or implicitly permit withdrawal of a
specific referral. As noted above, the referral process comprises three steps. The
provision for withdrawal from the first step (becoming a state party) but not the
others (specifically, making a referral) suggests, if not the negative implication of
deliberate omission,"8 then at least the lack of consideration of the capability to
withdraw a referral under the Statute. Viewed together with the many other
options for delay, deferral, and termination of a case, this omission or lack of
consideration is conspicuous.
Article 121 briefly addresses withdrawal from the treaty "with immediate
effect" as a legitimate response by a state party to an amendment to the Rome
Statute, but conditions the withdrawal on compliance with Article 127(2).7 This
article therefore similarly affirms a state's sovereign right not to be bound
involuntarily to new treaty obligations while holding that state accountable for
those obligations already in place. Of course, Article 121 does not have any
effect until 2009 at the earliest.8"
Article 124 allows a state party to withdraw "at any time" a declaration
limiting its recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICC; 1 in other words, the
Statute does not restrict a state party from entering further into the auspices of
the Court, as opposed to withdrawing from it. Finally, Article 61 establishes the
Prosecutor's power to withdraw charges in certain circumstances and does not
relate to states parties' actions.
In order to more fully consider the concept of withdrawal of a referral with
respect to the Statute, it is helpful to more clearly define the concept. A referral
is the submission by a state party of a situation to the Prosecutor;8 2 upon the
Prosecutor's recommendation, the Court can then exercise its jurisdiction over
78

Epressio unius est exclusio alterius, "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the
other, or of the alternative." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed 2004). This canon of construction is
"at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context." Id, quoting
F. Reed Dickerson, The lnteepretation and Application of Statutes 234-35 (Little, Brown 1975).
Fortunately, the Rome Statute provides ample context in which to examine this idea.
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ICC Statute, art 121(6).
Id, art 121(1); amendments to the Rome Statute cannot be proposed until July 1, 2009 ("After the
expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose
amendments thereto.").
Id, art 124.
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Id, art 14(1).
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specific crimes in that situation. 83 Several ICC experts have described a selfreferral more specifically as a state party's voluntary decision to relinquish its
domestic jurisdiction over a situation. 4 Self-referral implies also that the state
party will not be invoking complementarity to prevent the ICC from
prosecuting. Logically, then, a withdrawal of a referral is the unilateral removal
or retraction of a situation from the Court's jurisdiction, assuming the Court has
taken the steps to exercise its jurisdiction. 8
In this respect, the Rome Statute is crystal clear. Article 19(1) states that "the
Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it."
The notion of competence de la competence, a court's power to determine its own
jurisdiction, is so well settled in international law that "the requirement in this
paragraph that the Court satisfy itself in any case before it that it has jurisdiction
was not strictly necessary."8 6 A state may challenge the jurisdiction or the
admissibility of a case under Rule 19 once the Court has taken jurisdiction,8" but
a state party cannot unilaterally supersede the authority of the Court to deny
jurisdiction.

83

Id, art 13(a), stating

86

The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A situation in
which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred
to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14 ....
Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Intl L at 388 (cited in note 4); El Zeidy, 5 Intl Crim L Rev at
100, 102, 104 (cited in note 51); Akhavan, 99 Am J Intl L at 404, 413-416, 418 (cited in note 10).
All three articles cite the 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
CriminalCourt as the origin of the "relinquish" language (discussed further in Section II.B), in the
context of discussing the legitimacy of self-referrals. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an InternationalCriminalCourt, UN GAOR, 50th Sess, Supp No 22, 47, UN Doc
A/50/22 (1995). Arsanjani and Reisman contend that a case deriving from a self-referral is
inadmissible before the ICC, while El Zeidy and Akhavan (writing at about the same time and
using very similar language) seem to agree that self-referrals are legitimate and admissible.
Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Ind L at 386-391 (cited in note 4); El Zeidy, 5 Ind Crim L Rev
at 104 (cited in note 52) ("There is no logic in rejecting a State's attempt to relinquish its
jurisdiction in favor of the Court from the outset."); Akhavan, 99 Am J Intl L at 415 (cited in note
10) ("[T]here is no basis, in law or policy, for the assertion that states cannot voluntarily relinquish
jurisdiction in favor of the ICC."). The current Chief Prosecutor seemingly takes the latter view.
See Section III.C.2.a for discussion of whether and when the Court's jurisdiction has been
exercised.
Christopher K. Hall, Article 19: Challenges to the Jurisdictionof the Court or the Admissibifihy of a Case, in
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Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentay on the Rome Statute, 2 (cited in note 38) (citing the case of
Prosecutorv Tadic from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
ICC Statute, arts 19(2), (4), (5), (7).
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B. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE ROME STATUTE
The drafting history of the Rome Statute, like the Statute itself, contains
virtually no discussion of the possibility of withdrawal of a state party referral.
This fact is unsurprising, given that this issue arose out of the self-referral
phenomenon, which was itself barely considered by the drafters. However, the
absence of discussion of withdrawal, the minimal consideration of self-referral,
the drafters' heavy focus on issues of complementarity and jurisdiction, and the
language of the draft statute itself, taken as a whole, convey the strong
impression that the drafters did not intend to provide a state with the power to
unilaterally withdraw a referral from the Court and did intend to bind states to
their obligations under the Statute.
As discussed above, the drafters of the Rome Statute apparently never
"contemplated that the Statute would include voluntary state referrals to the
Court of difficult cases arising in their own territory.' 8 8 On the contrary, the
drafters envisioned a "typically interstate trigger mechanism" 9 like those in place
at other human rights bodies, and the debate over state referrals therefore
centered primarily on which states could refer, and whether states should refer,
situations or individual cases.90 Secondary to these concerns was the drafters'
fear of abuse of the process by states for "frivolous or vexatious purposes.91
The drafters also believed that states would submit referrals only rarely
anyway. As one observer has pointed out, the interstate complaint mechanism
"is not particularly suitable for the purpose of individual criminal justice,"
because "state complaints are, typically, aimed at initiating proceedings before
the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal entrusted with the task
of settling a dispute between States and possibly ascertaining an internationally
wrongful act."92 Additionally, a number of drafters and ICC experts have cited
the general failure of states to use the interstate complaint procedures available
at various other human rights bodies as evidence that states would be reluctant
to initiate "independent international inquiries into human rights violations" by
other states at the fledgling ICC.93 Consequently, it was expected that the ICC
Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Intl L at 386-387 (cited in note 4).
89 Antonio Marchesi, Aride 14: Referralof a Situation by a State Party in Triffterer, ed, Commentay on the
Rome Statute, 6 (cited in note 38).
90
See generally Kirsch and Robinson, Referral by States Parlies (cited in note 58); Williams, Arie 13:
Exercise ofJurisdiclion, 10 (cited in note 38).
91
Williams, Aride 13: Exercise ofJurisdiction at 622 (cited in note 38). See also Arsanjani and Reisman,
99 Am J Intl L at 387 n 9 (cited in note 4).
92
Marchesi, Aride 14: Referral of a Situation by a State Pary, 6 (cited in note 89).
88

93

Id ("Certain precedents, including the failure of the interstate complaint procedure provided for
by the ICCPR, indicate that Governments are not inclined to set off independent international
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would have to rely primarily on Security Council referrals (at least at first)9 4 and

the Prosecutor's independent powers 5 in order to actually exercise the Court's
jurisdiction and prosecute individual cases.
A lone example of the consideration of self-referral exists in the drafting
history, disguised as a question of "waiver of complementarity." The first
President of the ICC Assembly of States Parties, Mohamed M. El Zeidy,
succinctly describes this example in his discussion of the Ugandan self-referral:
The question of waiver first arose during the discussions of the 1995 Adhoc
Committee and seemed to be controversial. While it has been proposed that the
Statute should permit a situation where a State might "voluntarily decide to
relinquish its jurisdiction in favour" of the ICC, the proposal did not gain
support from some delegations. Some of them believed that such a proposal
would be inconsistent with the principle of complementarity as the ICC "should
in no way undermine the effectiveness of national justice systems and should
only be resorted to in exceptional cases." ... A footnote was inserted to that
effect in subsequent drafts and remained until the Rome Conference. It was not
discussed however, during the Conference as many delegations thought that the
issue would be better dealt with in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The
Rules, however, were silent regarding this question and it seems that this issue
6
was left to the Court's interpretation.9

inquiries into human rights violations by other Governments .... "); Gaeta, 2 J Intl Crim Just at
951 (cited in note 57) ("In practice, however, states are likely to take advantage of this opportunity
rarely, as the small number of interstate complaints within the framework of human rights treaties
clearly shows."); Kirsch and Robinson, Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutorat 662-63 n 28 (cited
in note 58) ("]he experience under various human rights conventions was a persuasive
indication that reliance on States to refer situations would not be ideal.'). Kirsch and Robinson
further note that no inter-state human tights complaints had, to date, been brought either under
the ICCPR or to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights under the American Convention on
Human Rights, and that only seven such cases had been brought before the European
Commission on Human Rights, of which only one came before the European Court.
Also, as the website for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights helpfully
states: "Several of the Human Rights Treaties contain provisions to allow for State parties to
complain to the relevant treaty body about alleged violations of the treaty by another State party.
Note: these procedures have never been used." Human R'gbts Bodies-Complaints Procedures:InterState Complaints, available online at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/> (visited
Dec 5, 2008).
94

Williams, Article 12: Preconditionsto the Exercise ofJurisdiction, 3 (cited in note 38); Marchesi, Artile
14: Referral of a Situation by a State Party, 5 (cited in note 89).

95

Kirsch and Robinson, Referral by States Partiesat 663 (cited in note 58); Marchesi, Article 14: Referral
of a Situation by a State Party, 5 (cited in note 89).
El Zeidy, 5 Intl Crim L Rev at 100 (cited in note 52), citing, in part, the Report of the Ad Hoc

96

Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 47 (cited in note 84); John T.
Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in Roy S. Lee, ed, The International Criminal Court: The
Making of the Rome Statute-Issues, Negotiations, Results 41, 78 (Martinus Nijhoff 1999); Draft Statute
for the International Criminal Court and Draft Final Act, art 15, UN Doc A/ CONF.183/2/
Add.1 (1998).
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At this point, of course, the Prosecutor has encouraged, and the Court has
apparently accepted, self-referrals 'as a means of triggering the Court's
jurisdiction. Given the low profile of this note in the drafting history over the
years, the drafters never focused on the additional implications of such a
concept-such as the possibility of withdrawal of a self-referral.
The drafters were also preoccupied with the definition of jurisdiction in two
important respects, for the purposes of this discussion. First, Professor Sharon
A. Williams's analysis of the drafting history of Articles 12 and 13 demonstrates
that the drafters very carefully constructed the jurisdictional regime for these two
articles. The resulting articles were a compromise, especially with regard to
Article 12, that backed away from giving the Court universal or inherent
jurisdiction and instead created very heavy reliance on state party consent and
referral for the Court to function. 9 The sudden and unilateral withdrawal of
jurisdiction from the Court would therefore interfere with the functioning of the
Court, at best, and destroy the Court's functioning altogether, at worst. Such
withdrawal is incompatible with the jurisdictional structure created in these
articles.
Second, the drafting history shows that the drafters strongly supported the
inclusion of the concept of competence de la competence in Article 19. This concept is
so well established as to be almost taken for granted by the Court, as discussed
above in Section I.A. John T. Holmes, one of the Rome Statute's drafters, has
noted that "the principle that the Court must always satisfy itself as to its
jurisdiction was widely supported. The language eventually agreed upon made
clear that this duty existed throughout all stages of the proceedings." 9 The
drafters therefore always intended for the Court to control decisions regarding a
case over which it had exercised jurisdiction. The idea that a state could
unilaterally withdraw jurisdiction from the Court directly contradicts the drafters'
intentions and the eventual Rome Statute's language.
Finally, the 1998 Draft Statute, the penultimate version of the Rome Statute,
provides additional insight into the drafters' thinking. Like the final Statute, the
1998 Draft Statute contains no mention of withdrawal of a referral, only
withdrawal in unrelated contexts or regarding the statute as a whole.99 There is
one semi-exception, however. Article 9 of the Draft Statute (which would
eventually become Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute) contains several options
for "Acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court."' 00 Option 2 of this draft article

98

See generally Williams, Article 12: Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction (cited in note 94);
Williams, Article 13: Exercise ofJurisdiction (cited in note 38).
Holmes, The Prindple of Complementarity at 61 (cited in note 96).

99

See, for example, 1998 Draft Statute, arts 58, 59, 61, 87, 90, 109, 110, 115 (cited in note 96).
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100 Id, art 9,
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would allow a state to accept the jurisdiction of the Court after the state
becomes a party "at a later time, by declaration lodged with the Registrar,"' '
rather than automatically as a condition to becoming a state party (like the
eventual Rome Statute Article 12(3)). Option 2 further provides:
A declaration may be made for a specified period, in which case it may not be
withdrawn before the end of that period, or for an unspecified period, in which
case it may be withdrawn only upon giving a six month's notice of withdrawal
to the Registrar. Withdrawal
does not affect proceedings already commenced
02
under this Statute.
Although the drafters ultimately rejected this option in favor of automatic
consent to the Court's general jurisdiction,'0 3 its inclusion reveals the drafters'
specific intention to bind states parties to the obligations incurred by a state's
consent to jurisdiction, even when allowing a state flexibility in its consent. This
translates directly to the notion that a state cannot rescind a decision to
relinquish jurisdiction over a situation to the Court, as would happen in the case
of withdrawal of a referral.
C. BEYOND THE ROME STATUTE-COMPARISON WITH OTHER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES
The ICC has yet to produce any case law with which to analyze this issue
concerning the Rome Statute. It is useful, therefore, to look to the other
international human rights supervisory and adjudicative bodies for comparison
and analysis. It is worth noting that the ICC is not itself a comprehensive human
rights court or treaty; rather, the Court is a criminal court with jurisdiction over
those abuses of human rights that constitute "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole.' 1 4 The Court is therefore a
limited or secondary human rights body. Article 21 of the Rome Statute
specifically requires that the Court apply, in addition to the Statute and rules of
the Court itself,'
"applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international law, ' 6 and requires that "the application and interpretation of law
pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human

101 Id, art 9, Option 2

1(b).

102

Id,

103

ICC Statute, art 12(1) ("A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.").

3.

104

Id, art 5(1).

105

Id, art 21(1)(a) ('The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and

106

its Rules of Procedure and Evidence..
Id, art 21(1)(b).
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rights."' 1 7 The Court will no doubt look to the other international criminal
tribunals as it prosecutes specific crimes and addresses issues of criminal
procedure. On the other hand, the international human rights bodies are
especially relevant with regard to broader issues of human rights principles and
procedures.
1. The Statutes of the Major Human Rights Bodies
A simple comparison between the Rome Statute and the statutory basis of
every other human rights body shows that these statutes uniformly uphold the
principle of competence de la competence and reject unilateral withdrawal from the
jurisdiction of that body, where and when they speak to these issues. Two types
of relevant international human rights supervisory bodies currently exist. First,
there are the four international human rights courts: the International Court of
justice ("JCJ"),0 8 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACtHR"), the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), and the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights.'0 9 Second, five of the core international human
rights treaties of the UN have established supervisory, quasi-adjudicative bodies
that hear cases or complaints: The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") has established the Human Rights Committee to monitor
implementation of the Covenant;" 0 additionally, a supervisory Committee has
been established for each of the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against

107

Id, art 21(3).

108

The ICJ is not a human rights court per se; rather, the ICJ is a human rights court incidentally as
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the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations," whose purposes include "promoting and
encouraging human rights." United Nations Charter, arts 1(3), 92.
The African court is "not yet functioning," due to its relatively recent establishment; however, its
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statute is in place. See generally The African Court on Human and People's Rights, available online at
<http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts-conti/achpr/achpr-home.html>
(visited Dec 5, 2008);
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Jan 1, 2004), available online at
<http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents/Treaties-/ 20Conventions-/2Protocols
/africancourt-humanights.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (Oct 21, 1986).
See generally UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc A/6316, Part IV
(Mar 23, 1976) ("ICCPR"); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, available online at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a.opt.htm> (visited Dec 5,
2008).
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Women, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment."'
Every one of the statutes or treaties that serves as the foundation of these
nine human rights bodies and allows denunciation or withdrawal from the treaty,
or withdrawal from a conditional acceptance of the court's or committee's
jurisdiction to hear cases or complaints, contains a stipulation that such
withdrawal or denunciation shall not release the state from obligations arising,
acts occurring, and/or cases or complaints commencing while that state was still
party to the treaty or statute." 2 Every treaty or statute providing for
denunciation requires at least six months' notice," 3 and four of them require a

111 See generally International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families ("ICRMW"), UN Doc A/45/49 (2003); The Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW Optional
Protocol'), 38 ILM 763 (1999); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), UN Doc A/39/51 at 197 (1984); International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("ICERD"), 5 ILM 352
(1966). The remaining two core international human rights treaties, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, also have
supervisory committees, but these treaty bodies do not hear cases or complaints. See UN Office
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies, available online at <http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRbodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
112 See ICRtvlVW, arts 89(3) (denunciation), 77(8) (conditional acceptance); ICERD, art 14(3) (oddly,

113

conditional acceptance only); CEDAW Optional Protocol, art 19(2) (denunciation only); CAT,
arts 21(2) (conditional withdrawal), 31(2) (denunciation); ICCPR, art 41(2) (conditional acceptance
only; the ICCPR does not allow denunciation or withdrawal from the Covenant, see Section
III.C.2.b.iv below); American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Ser No 36, 1144 UN
Treaty Set 123, art 78(2) (denunciation) (July 18, 1978), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/SerLV/1182 doc6 revi at 25 (1992); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European
Convention on Human Rights'), as amended by Protocol No 11 (with Protocol Nos 1,4,6,7, 12
and 13), art 58(2) (denunciation), signed Nov 4, 1950, entered into force on Sept 3, 1953, 213 UN
Treaty Set 221. The ICJ and the African Court do not provide for either denunciation or any sort
of limited withdrawal, creating the "rebuttable presumption" under Article 56 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention') that they are not subject to
denunciation or withdrawal. See generally Protocol to the African Charter; Vienna Convention,
art 56(1), concluded at Vienna on May 23, 1969, entered into force on Jan 27, 1980 ("A treaty
which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for
denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is
established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b)
a tight of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.'); Statute of the
International Court ofJustice ("ICJ Statute"), 59 Stat 1055, 3 Bevans 1153 (1945).
See CEDAW Optional Protocol, art 19(1); European Convention on Human Rights, art 58(2).
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full year."' Finally, all four of the human rights courts stipulate their competence de
la competence, such that the court alone decides disputes or issues of jurisdiction." 5
One could reasonably conclude, based on this unified overview of the other
major human rights bodies, that the narrow realm of international human rights
treaties and courts has developed a customary international law relating to the
procedure for withdrawal, in that such courts must alone decide matters of
jurisdiction, that states remain bound to obligations incurred under such treaties
in the event of withdrawal or denunciation, and that such withdrawal or
denunciation requires at least six months notice, where it is permitted at all. The
case law of these bodies bolsters this view as well.
2. The Case Law
Judicial Bodies

of the

Major International

Human Rights

The major international human rights judicial bodies have produced a
considerable amount of directly relevant case law and legal analysis with which
to further examine the issue of withdrawal of a referral. The IACtHR in
particular has come out with several comprehensive legal rulings that provide
excellent context for consideration of issues of jurisdiction, withdrawal, treaty
interpretation, and human rights law. The IACtHR also delivers the sole
convincing case in favor of withdrawal of a referral in very narrow
circumstances. These other human rights bodies have generally given the
seemingly narrow issue of withdrawal important depth and definition.
a) Case law supporting the night of withdrawal In one of its earlier cases, the
1ACtHR held that a party may, in fact, legally and unilaterally withdraw a case
from the Court in certain, limited circumstances. In the Cayara Case (Cayara v
Peru), the Inter-American Commission submitted four joint cases against Peru to
the Court after completing the standard Commission investigative procedure." 6
But the Commission withdrew the case from the Court shortly thereafter in
response to strenuous protestations from the Peruvian government over alleged
procedural errors." 7 Significantly, the Commission did not request permission to
withdraw the case; rather, the Commission Chairman simply declared his
decision in a note to the Court Secretariat "for the time being to withdraw the
case from the Court, in order to reconsider it and possibly present it again at
114

115

116

117

See ICRMW, art 89(2); ICERD, art 21; CAT, art 31(1); and American Convention on Human
Rights, art 78(2).
See ICJ Statute, art 36(6); American Convention on Human Rights, art 62(1); European
Convention on Human Rights, art 32(2); Protocol to the African Charter, art 3(2).
Caarav Peru (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of (Feb 3, 1993), Inter-Am Ct HR (set C) no 14
26, available online at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_14_ing.pdf>
(visited Dec 5, 2008) ('Cayara Case").
Id.
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some future date," and withdrew it." 8 The Secretariat acknowledged the
Chairman's note and apparently accepted the withdrawal." 9 The Commission
then amended the referral to correct the irregularities and resubmitted the case
20
to the Court several months later.
Peru specifically objected to the withdrawal of the case in its preliminary
objections, claiming that the Commission's action was illegal and the case was
"annulled," due to the fact that neither the American Convention nor the Court
rules "contemplate the possibility of withdrawing ...a case submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Court."'2 The IACtHR, however, found the withdrawal to be
perfectly legitimate in light of the objection's basis in Article 51 of the American
Convention on Human Rights.122 Article 51 addresses, in part, whether a matter
has been "submitted by the Commission or by the state concerned to the Court
and its jurisdiction accepted., 123 After conceding the absence of any statutory or
procedural reference to withdrawal of an application,12 1 the Court stated:
This does not mean that it is inadmissible. General principles of procedural
law allow the applicant party to request a court not to process its
application, provided the court has not begun to take up the case. As a rule, that stage
begins with the notifcation of the otherparty. Furthermore, the foundation of the
Court's jurisdiction, as set forth in Article 61(1) of the Convention, lies in
the will of the Commission or of the States Parties.
49. In a case before the Court, formal notification of the application does
not occur automatically but requires a preliminary review by the President in
order to determine whether the basic requirements of that action have been
met. This is spelled out in Article 27 of the Rules in force, which reflects the
long-standing practice of the Court ....
51. In the instant case, the request for withdrawal presented by the
Commission occurred before the President of the Court was able to
conduct the preliminary review of the application and, consequently, before
he was in a position to order the notification of same. The President had
not even been apprised of the communication... by which the
Commission notified the Government that the case had been referred to the
Court ....125
118

Id.

119 Id, 727.
120

Id,

121

Id,

30.

122

46. Comically, Peru's objection to the withdrawal was also based in part on apparent
indignation at the claim that Peru had requested the withdrawal; Peru had actually requested that
the case not be submitted at all. This is not the last example of Peru's sensitive disposition
towards the Court.
Id,
35, 54.

123

American Convention on Human Rights, art 51(1).

124

Id,

125

Id,

48.
48, 49, 51 (emphasis added).
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The Court therefore concluded that the withdrawal occurred in the window that
exists after the Commission referred the case and before the Court accepted
jurisdiction, and it ultimately recognized the withdrawal as legitimate (while
upholding Peru's objections on other grounds).'2 6
It is logical to conclude that states parties may similarly withdraw a referral
from the ICC before the ICC has taken any steps to exercise jurisdiction. As the
current Prosecutor has noted, "neither referrals nor private communications
automatically 'trigger' the powers of the Prosecutor.' 2 7 Instead, once a case is
referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor must "conduct an analysis"' 26 and evaluate
the information made available to him;'2 9 determine whether there is a
reasonable basis to proceed and commence an investigation;130 "notify all States
Parties and those States which... would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crimes concerned;' ' 131 and, finally, initiate an investigation. 32 The Prosecutor
additionally has stated that "not every situation can be immediately investigated"
133
and that "some situations must be carefully monitored for some time.'
The Rome Statute and the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not
state explicitly when a case has been "taken up" or when the jurisdiction of the
Court is officially in effect. The plain language of Article 13 of the Rome Statute,
stating that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if a referral is made, suggests
that the Court or the Prosecutor must take affirmative action to accept
jurisdiction, analogous to Article 51 of the American Convention. The current
Prosecutor's statements indicate his position that his response to a referral by
gathering and assessing of relevant information represents the commencement
of the ICC process. 34 Alternatively, the IACtHR, which uses initial procedures

126

Id,

51-63. The Court does not actually conclude on the withdrawal issue; it merely proceeds on

the presumption that the withdrawal was not "unjustified or arbitrary." Id, 52.
127 Annex to the 'Paper on Some Poliy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor":Referrals and Communications
(Annex to the Policy Paper), 1 (September 2003), available online at <www.icc-cpi.int/library/
organs/otp/policy-annexfinal_210404.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
128

Id.

129

ICC Statute, art 53(1) ("In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall
consider whether: (a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed ... .

130

Id, art 18(1).

131

Id.

132

Id, art 53(1).

133

Annex to the Policy Paper at 3-4 (cited in note 127).

134 Id at 1-4.
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similar to those of the ICC,'35 noted that its own participation begins "with the
notification of the other party.' ' 136 In the case of the ICC, such commencement
occurs when the Prosecutor notifies states parties which would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the Crimes concerned and opens an investigation.
The fact is virtually indisputable, in light of the Prosecutor's statements and
the Rome Statute's regime, that a temporal gap exists between the referral of a
case to the ICC and the actual exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction. The admitted
existence of this gap sufficiently satisfies the IACtHR holding and establishes
the possibility that a referring party (including the Security Council) can
withdraw a case within this limited window under the Rome Statute as well. The
recognition of this possibility by the ICC could show flexibility and offer
comfort to both states parties and those states considering accession to the
Rome Statute. This possibility also could provide political cover for those states
(or the Security Council) whose referral is met with immediate or severe
protestation by its own citizens, its neighbors, or the international community.
While the current Prosecutor has expressed firmly that a state may not withdraw
a case already well-under investigation, he has shown creativity and flexibility
with ICC law in his Policy Paper and might consider this accommodating,
though limited, possibility.
The problem, of course, from a state's perspective is that such a withdrawal
could provide temporary cover but does not allow the state to fully escape the
Court's jurisdiction. As long as a state remains party to the Rome Statute and its
acceptance of the Court's general jurisdiction remains in place, the Prosecutor
may still exert his proprio motu power with respect to that state. If sufficient
conditions exist to prompt a state to refer a situation in the first place, then the
Prosecutor may well agree enough to exert that power once a case is withdrawn.
In this regard it is significant that Luis Moreno-Ocampo has said that his
prosecutorial decisions would not be governed by political considerations, and
that if the international community wants the ICC to defer to an amnesty or
exile deal then it should be for the Security Council to make that decision under
Article 16 of the Rome Statute.' 37
b) Case law opposing the right of withdrawal.The case law and legal analysis of
the other international human rights bodies reaffirms the prerogative of

135 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rghts, arts 32-35 (2003), available online at
<http://www.cidh.org/basicos/English/Basicl 8.Rules%2Oof/20Procedure%20of /20the%20C
ommission.htm> (visited Dec 5, 2008); ICC Statute, art 18(1) and (2).
136 CayaraCase,

48.

137 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Building a Future on Peace andJustice,address at International Conference in
Nuremberg (June 25, 2007), available online at <http://www.peace-justiceconference'info/
download/speech%20moreno.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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international courts to determine their own jurisdiction and rejects the ability of
a state to withdraw from treaty obligations or the jurisdiction of the requisite
court, just as their statutory and treaty counterparts do. The ICJ in particular
defined some of the basic limitations to withdrawal or modifications of
obligations under an international agreement. Moreover, this case law and
analysis establishes a higher plane of obligation and greater restrictions on the
ability of a state party to withdraw or derogate from a human rights treaty. The
IACtHR and the ICCPR Human Rights Committee have clarified and
strengthened the nature of human rights treaties. This law and analysis further
establish that a state party cannot unilaterally withdraw from its obligations
under a human rights treaty.
(1) The International Court of Justice. The ICJ addressed the most
famous (or notorious) attempt by a state to unilaterally evade its treaty
obligations and sidestep a court's jurisdiction in the case of Nicaragua v United
States.'38 In 1984, Nicaragua announced that it was filing a case against the US at
the ICJ, pursuant to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the two countries, over US support of Nicaraguan rebels and mining of
Nicaraguan harbors. In a transparent attempt to preempt the case, the US
notified the ICJ three days prior to the filing (which the United States knew was
imminent) that the US had "modified" its declaration of recognition of the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction, such that the declaration "shall not apply to disputes
with any Central American State or arising out of or related to events in Central
America," and stating that "this proviso shall take effect immediately."' 3 9 The US
then argued at the ICJ that "States have the sovereign right to qualify an
acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction."14
The Court laid out the fundamental precepts of jurisdiction and withdrawal
(or modification) in denying the US' contention. The Court noted that "both
Parties apparently recognize that a modification of a declaration which only
takes effect after the Court has been validly seized does not affect the Court's
jurisdiction". .4 that is once the Court has exercised jurisdiction over a case,
neither party can then unilaterally exert some effect over that jurisdiction. The
Court then noted that the US' attempted modification was really an attempt to
exempt itself from its obligations vis-A-vis the Court's jurisdiction under the
bilateral treaty in question.42 While a state is free to enter into such obligations
138

Case concerning Militagy and ParamilitayActitifies in and againstNicaragua (Nicarv US) EJurisdiction of
the Court and Admissibility of the Application) 1984

139

Id, 13.

140

Id, 53.

141

Id,

142

Id, 58.

54.
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with respect to other states, it cannot then freely break legal obligations once
established. The Court cited the customary legal concept of pacta sunt servanda'43
to clarify that good faith is "one of the basic principles governing the creation
and performance of legal obligations.... Thus interested States may take
cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are
entitled to require that the obligation thus created be respected."' 144 The Court
concluded that such a modification as attempted by the US required a
"reasonable period of notice,' 4' and it thereby rejected the US attempt to quash
the ICJ's jurisdiction in the case and defined one of the best-known rules with
regard to the issue of withdrawal.
The ICJ later briefly expanded on its holding in Nicaraguain the 1998 case of
Cameroon v Nigeria.146 Citing Nicaragua, the Court noted that "withdrawal ends
existing consensual bonds, while deposit establishes such bonds. The effect of
withdrawal is therefore purely and simply to deprive other States which have
already accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of the right they had to bring
proceedings before it against the withdrawing State."' 47 This holding makes clear
that an immediate, unilateral withdrawal from a treaty not only violates the legal
obligations voluntarily entered into by a state, but it also deprives the rights of
those also legally protected under the treaty.
The ICJ simultaneously defended the power of the Court to define its own
jurisdiction and rejected the prerogative of a state to unilaterally withdraw from,
and therefore violate, its legal obligations under a treaty. This finding bolsters
the conclusions already established with respect to the Rome Statute.
Additionally, the Court's language noting the deprivation of the rights of other
parties by a withdrawal helps clarify the special protection afforded to human
rights treaties, as is similarly affirmed by the IACtHR.
(2) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In a set of cases in the
1990s, the IACtHR dealt simultaneously with issues of interference with the
Court's competence de la competence, and unilateral withdrawal both from a case and
from a human rights treaty. The Inter-American Commission referred two cases
against Peru to the IACtHR in March and July of 1999 respectively, the Ivcher

143

Rather than the Vienna Convention, due to the fact that the bilateral treaty predated the Vienna
Convention.

14
145

Case concerning Militay and Paramilitagy Activities in and against Nicaragua,
jurisprudence in the Nuclear Tests cases).
Id,
63, 65.

60 (citing its own

146 Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria),
(Preliminary Objections), 1998 ICJ 275 (June 11, 1998).
147 Id,

34.
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Bronstein Case'48 and the ConstitutionalCourt Case.'49 The Court in turn notified
Peru of each of the applications, according to procedure)5 0 In response first to
the Constitutional Court Case, the Peruvian government simply returned the
application to the Court and submitted a note to the Court Secretariat stating
that
On July 9, 1999, the Government of the Republic of Peru deposited with the
General Secretariat of the Organization of American States the instrument
wherein it declares that, pursuant to the American Convention on Human
Rights, the Republic of Peru is withdrawing the declaration consenting to the
optional clause concerning recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights ....The withdrawal of recognition of
the Court's contentious jurisdiction takes immediate effect as of the date on
which that instrument is deposited with the General Secretariat of the OAS, in
other words, July 9, 1999, and applies to 5all1 cases in which Peru has not
answered the application filed with the Court.
Peru subsequently responded identically to the Ivcher Bronstein Case"5 2 and
thereafter made no other response to either case.
The Court delivered its ruling on "the question of Peru's purported
withdrawal of its declaration recognizing the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court and of its legal effects" in the two cases the following September. 1 3 The
Court first noted that not only does it possess the inherent authority to
determine whether it has jurisdiction in a given case, "as with any court or
tribunal, ' 1 4 but also that a state party's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction
according to the American Convention necessarily implies that the state also
"accept[s] the Court's right to settle any controversy relative to its
jurisdiction."'5 5 The Court consequently found that "recognition of the Court's
binding jurisdiction is an ironclad clause to which there can be no limitations
148

149

IvcherBronstein v Peru, (Competence), Judgment of (Sept 24, 1999), Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) no 54,
available online at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_54_ing.pdf> (visited
Dec 5, 2008) ("IvherBronstein Case").
Constitutional Court v Peru, (Competence), Judgment of (Sept 24, 1999), Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) no
55, available online at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-55ing.pdf>
(visited Dec 5, 2008) C'ConstitutionalCourt Case").

150

ConstitutionalCourt Case, 22; Ivcher Bronstein Case, 19.
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ConstitutionalCourtCase,

152

Ivcher Bronstein Case, 23.
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31. The Court ruled on the two cases separately but delivered virtually
point, this article will refer and cite specifically to the holding of the
From
this
holdings.
identical
ConstitutionalCourt Case, with the understanding that the language and conclusions are nearly
identical to those in the Ivcber Bronstein Case, that opinion containing only minor and insignificant
grammatical differences.
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except those expressly provided for" in the Convention." 6 Using the Vienna
Convention as a guide,' and noting the absence in the American Convention of
any provision for withdrawing recognition of the Court's jurisdiction,5 8 the
Court concluded that a state party to the American Convention "can only release
itself of its obligations under the Convention by following the provisions that
the treaty itself stipulates."' 9 In these cases, "the only avenue the State has to
disengage itself from the Court's binding contentious jurisdiction is to denounce
the Convention as a whole," in accordance with the Convention provisions,
which additionally require one year's notice. 6 °
The Court then moved to a broader discussion of human rights treaties,
noting first that to allow a state party to defy the Convention itself would
effectively be to allow that state to suppress or restrict the human rights that the
Convention exists to protect. 6 ' The Court stated that human rights treaties "are
inspired by a set of higher common values (centered around the protection of
the human person) . . . and have a special character that sets them apart from
other treaties.,' 62 Citing its own case law and that of several cases from the ICJ
and the ECtHR in support of the rigorous enforcement of human rights
treaties,'6 3 the Court contended that a state that accepts the Court's jurisdiction
under the Convention "binds itself to the whole of the Convention and is fully
committed to guaranteeing the international protection of human rights that the
Convention embodies."'16 4 Ultimately, given the rigorous construction of the
Convention and the elevated nature of human rights treaties, "States cannot
expect to have the same amount of discretion" in human rights cases as they
may have in "international disputes involving purely interstate litigation.' 65
The Court concluded with the finding that
The American Convention is very clear that denunciation is of "this
Convention" (Article 78) as a whole, and not denunciation of or "release" from
parts or clauses thereof, since that would undermine the integrity of the whole.
Applying the criteria of the Vienna Convention (Article 56(1)), it does not
appear to have been the Parties' intention to allow this type of denunciation or

157

Id,
Id,

35.
37.
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Id,

38.
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release; nor can denunciation or release be inferred
from the character of the
166
American Convention as a human rights treaty.
In closing, the Court also cited Nicaragua v United States in reiterating the broader
principle that "in order for an optional clause to be unilaterally terminated, the
pertinent rules of the law of treaties must be applied. Those rules clearly
167
preclude any possibility of a termination or 'release' with 'immediate effect'.'
The IACtHR expanded its jurisprudence on human rights treaties a few
years later in the case of Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago.168 In Caesar, the Court
affirmed the principle that "the denunciation clause under the American
Convention [ ] was surrounded by temporal limitations so as not to allow it to
undermine the protection of human rights thereunder."' 6 9 Trinidad and Tobago
is one of several Caribbean nations that continues to employ "corporal
punishment" as part of its penal system; for example, some crimes are still
punished by flogging with a "cat-o-nine tails."17 A number of these nations have
denounced and withdrawn from the American Convention over controversy and
conflict with the Convention arising from such practices. Due to such
controversy and in anticipation of the filing of formal cases, Trinidad and
Tobago denounced the Convention in May of 199817 pursuant to Article 78 of
the Convention, which requires one year of notice and (similar to the Rome
Statute) stipulates that "such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing
the State Party concerned from the obligations contained in this Convention
with respect to any act that may constitute a violation of those obligations and72
that has been taken by that state prior to the effective date of denunciation.'
One day before the denunciation took effect in May of 1999, the Inter-American
Commission filed a case against Trinidad and Tobago at the Court, followed by
a succession of additional cases, all based on acts and incidents occurring prior
to Trinidad's denunciation. 17 Trinidad and Tobago declined to participate in any
of the subsequent proceedings before the Court. The Caesar ruling is the
conclusion of only one of these cases, but the Court members elaborated at
length on the issue of denunciation in this case especially.

166

Id,

50.

167

Id,

52.

168 Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago, (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Judgment of (Mar 11, 2005), InterAm Ct HR (ser C) no 123 (2005), available online at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec_123_ing.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) ("Caesa').
169 Id, 55 (separate opinion ofJudge A.A. Can ado Trindade).
170

Id,

171 Id,
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54 (separate opinion ofJudge A.A. Cangado Trindade).
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American Convention on Human Rights, art 78(2).
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The Court addressed the effects of denunciation in its initial establishment
of jurisdiction over the case. Noting that Article 78 of the Convention prevents
a state from evading its obligations prior to denunciation, 7 4 the Court turned to
the Vienna Convention to assess the general treaty principles:
In interpreting the American Convention in accordance with the general rules
of treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, bearing in mind the object and purpose of the American
Convention, this Tribunal, in the exercise of the authority conferred on it by
Article 62(3) of the American Convention, must act in a manner that preserves
the integrity of the provisions of Article 62(1) of the Convention. It would be
unacceptable to subordinate these provisions to restrictions that would render
inoperative the Court's jurisdictional role, and consequently,
the human rights
75
protection system established in the Convention.
The Court thus not only affirmed the importance of the Vienna Convention in
interpreting such treaties, but also spoke profoundly to the implications of a
state's attempt to withdraw from its obligations under a human rights treaty.
The concurring judges took the opportunity in Caesarto expound further on
the principles of human rights treaties. In a short concurrence, Judge Oliver
Jackman invoked the principle of pacta sunt servanda, noting that "the principle
that states should abide in good faith by the terms of treaties into which they
'17 6
voluntarily enter is the bedrock of international comity and international law.
He also pointed out the enshrinement of this principle in the Vienna
Convention. 7 7 Judge Jackman then expanded this concept with regard to human
rights treaties (echoing the Court in the Ivcher Bronstein and Constitutional Court
Cases), stating "it ought to be obvious that good faith compliance is of even
greater importance in the area of international human rights law, where what is
at stake is not the impersonal interests of states but the protection of the
fundamental rights of the individual."' 7 8 He proclaimed that Trinidad's
"contumelious" refusal to abide by the obligations of a treaty which, by
definition, extended a state's obligations beyond withdrawal "represents a
gratuitous attack on the Rule of Law."' 79
Judge A.A. Cangado Trindade (the presiding judge in the Ivcher Bronstein and
ConslitulionalCourt Cases), in his own concurrence, addressed at great length the
special nature of human rights treaties and the consequent mandate that
denunciations or limitations under such treaties cannot be used to detract from
174 Id,
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9.

176

Id, T (Jackman concurring).

177

Id, 2.

178

Id.
Id.

179

Vol. 9 No. 2

No Way Out?

Schaf andDowd

the protection of human rights. He cites the Vienna Convention as establishing
that "in practice... in the international law of human rights, somewhat
distinctly, there has been a clear and special emphasis on the element of the
object and purpose of the treaty, so as to ensure an effective protection ... of
the guaranteed rights."' 8 He later reaffirms that the Vienna Convention "open[s]
the way to the taking into account of the nature or specificity of certain
treaties."'' He also cites to the "converging case-law" of the IACtHR and the
ECtHR, in consideration of the Vienna Convention, as furthering the
establishment of a special nature for human rights treaties that, in turn, requires
82
special protections.'
In light of the Vienna Convention and the case law of the human rights
courts, Judge Trindade concludes that "permissible restrictions (limitations and
' and
derogations)" in human rights treaties must be "restrictively interpreted"1 83
that "certain limits have been established with regard to the denunciation of
such treaties."' 84 Specifically with respect to the American Convention, he
highlights again that the denunciation clause in Article 78 is "surrounded by
temporal limitations" that underscore the lasting protection of human rights and
the requisite prohibition on a state's unilaterally undermining those rights. He
summarized:
Thus, not even the institution of denunciation of treaties is so absolute in
effects as one might prima facie tend to assume. Despite its openness to
manifestations of State voluntarism, denunciation has, notwithstanding, been
permeated with basic considerations of humanity as well, insofar as treaties of a
humanitarian character are concerned. Ultimately, one is here faced with the
fundamental, overriding and inescapable principle of good faith (bona fides),
and one ought to act accordingly.' 85
(3) The European Court of Human Rights. The ECtHR has no such
dramatic examples of states seeking to unilaterally evade their treaty obligations
through withdrawal as do the ICJ, the IACtHR, and the UN Human Rights
Committee. (See Section III.C.2.b.iv below.) Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR contributes to the discussion of withdrawal and human rights
treaties in two important respects: First, the Court has put forth several
decisions promoting the "heightened" nature of human rights treaties over other
treaties, suggesting that withdrawal from human rights commitments should be
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more difficult than from ordinary treaty obligations. Second, the Court has
consistently, if mundanely, asserted its jurisdictional control over any actual
attempt by an applicant to the Court to "withdraw" an application.
Like the IACtHR, the ECtHR has elevated the protection to which human
rights treaties in particular are entitled. In the IACtHR's Caesaropinion which is
discussed above, Judge Trindade cited at least thirteen European cases in
support of the proposition that the "special character" of human rights treaties
demands that such treaties allow no room for limitations or reservations and
that they be restrictively interpreted.' 86
Additionally, the ECtHR has consistently and firmly exerted its jurisdictional
control over any invocation of the "strike out" provision of Article 37 of the
European Convention. 187 Where an applicant individual or state party seeks to
withdraw an application, the Court has addressed, as a preliminary matter,
whether it should accede to the request under the particular circumstances. 8' In
Tyrer v United Kngdom, the Court supported the European Commission's
previous rejection of the attempted withdrawal; pointedly, the respondent
Government conceded the Commission's prerogative to do so and
acknowledged the Court's discretion in the matter.'89 Similarly, the Court
rejected the respondent Government's request to strike out the application in
Subocheva v Russia, the Government having based its request on a dubious
application withdrawal by the applicant. 90 In both cases, the Commission and
the Court declined to relinquish jurisdiction over a case where questions of
"respect for human rights as defined in the Convention" remained unanswered
or unsettled.
On the other hand, in Akman v Turkey, the ECtHR acceded to the Turkish
government's request to strike out the pending application. 9 ' Considering the
Turkish government's admission of liability and wrongdoing, implementation of
forward-looking preventative measures, and offer of compensation to the
applicant, the Court declared itself "satisfied that respect for human rights as
defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to
continue the examination of the application," pursuant to Article 37(1)(c) of the

186

See generally id.

187

European Convention on Human Rights, art 37.

188

Subocheva v Russia, Judgment of 23 Eur Ct HR 2245/05

189

Judgment of 26 Eur Ct HR 37453/97
Ct HR 5856/72 25 (1978).
Trer v United Kingdom, 11 24-25.

190

Subocheva v Russia,

191 Akman v Turkey,

16-20 (2007); Akman v Turkey,

23-32 (2001); Tyrer v UnitedKingdom, Judgment of 25 Eur

16-20.
23-32.

Vol. 9 No. 2

Scharfand Dowvd

No Way Out?

Convention.' 92 Although the Court acceded based on criteria other than a
"withdrawal," the Akman v Turkey decision suggests that the Court will embrace
a flexible approach where the state party has made a real effort to rectify the
human rights violation at hand. Such an amicable solution demonstrates the
possibility of cooperation that exists in the Rome Statute's complementarity
scheme. Overall, the Court has shown both a reluctance to release jurisdiction
where human rights violations are unresolved and a willingness to work
cooperatively within the confines of a binding human rights treaty.
(4) The Human Rights Committee. The Human Rights Committee
established by the ICCPR has provided an important and relevant piece of legal
analysis regarding withdrawal of a party from a human rights treaty. In October
of 1997, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the ICCPR, in
response to the resolution of a UN sub-commission criticizing its human rights
practices.'93 In response, the Human Rights Committee adopted "General
Comment No 26" shortly thereafter during its general session deliberations.'94
Without specifically mentioning North Korea, the General Comment outlined
the case against unilateral withdrawal from the ICCPR under customary
international law.
The Committee first noted that in the absence of express provision in a
treaty for withdrawal or denunciation, the possibility of such must be evaluated
according to the Vienna Convention, which establishes that the treaty is not
subject to denunciation or withdrawal "unless it is established that the parties
intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal or a right to do
so is implied from the nature of the treaty."' 95 The Committee then stated that
the existence of clear reference within the same treaty to withdrawal in other
respects (referring to Article 41(2) of the ICCPR, allowing for withdrawal of a
declaration of recognition of the competence of the Committee'96) indicates the
awareness and deliberate rejection of the possibility by the parties drafting the
treaty. 1 7 More broadly speaking, the Committee found that a treaty that codifies
and protects "universal human rights ... does not have a temporary character
typical of treaties where a right of denunciation is deemed to be admitted,
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notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision to that effect.' 198
Furthermore, similar to arguments made at the IACtHR, the Committee
reiterated its view, "as evidenced by its long-standing practice," that the human
rights enshrined in the ICCPR "belong to the people living in the territory of the
State party" and that the protection of those rights "continues to belong to
them" and not to any state party or government.19' The Committee concluded
that international law does not allow a state party to denounce or withdraw from
the ICCPR.20
The Committee's brief response to North Korea's attempt to pull out of the
ICCPR appropriately wraps up the discussion of withdrawal and obligations
under a human rights treaty. The Committee affirms the use of the Vienna
Convention in analyzing human rights treaties, and it echoes the IACtHR in
reiterating the particular bias against a state withdrawing from its obligations
under a human rights treaty. These same principles apply to the ICC, given that
provision for withdrawal simply cannot be found in the Rome Statute.
D. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
The unilateral withdrawal of a state party referral from the ICC would
appear to violate the Rome Statute according to the Vienna Convention. 0' The
Vienna Convention naturally qualifies as one of the "applicable treaties" for
interpretation of the Rome Statute, pursuant to Article 21 of the Statute. °2
Gerhard Hafner, one of the drafters of the Rome Statute and a former member
of the International Law Commission, has stated that "since the Statute
constitutes a treaty concluded among States after the entry into force of the
Vienna Convention, the latter is applicable to the Statute in relation to States
parties which are also Parties to the Vienna Convention whereas the other States
Parties to the Statute have to resort to customary international law which
20 3
nevertheless has conformed to the regime of the Vienna Convention.
Additionally, given the frequent use of the Vienna Convention by the other
human rights bodies for addressing issues of withdrawal and jurisdiction, the
Vienna Convention provides an appropriate means for analyzing this issue and
complements the preceding case law.
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First and foremost, a withdrawal would contradict the Vienna Convention's
provision requiring that a treaty be interpreted with "the ordinary meaning" of
its terms and "in the light of its object and purpose."20 4 The ordinary meaning of
the terms of the Rome Statute appears to reject the possibility of withdrawal of a
referral. A withdrawal would only interfere with the functioning of the Court, in
contradiction with the object and purpose of the Statute, which is the
prosecution of "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community" through cooperation between national jurisdictions and the
Court.2 5 The preceding case law of the other human rights bodies has elevated
the meaning of this provision with respect to human rights treaties. Applying the
IACtHR's ruling in Caesar, such a withdrawal "would render inoperative the
Court's jurisdictional role, and consequently, the human rights protection system
established" in the Rome Statute. 2 6 Even if a state sought to withdraw a referral
for the sake of exercising its own criminal jurisdiction, the Statute provides a
multitude of cooperative procedural options that negate the need for unilateral
action.
The Vienna Convention also calls for the performance of treaty obligations
in good faith;2 °7 a unilateral withdrawal directly violates this provision, as a
withdrawal is a means of avoidance of the obligations imposed by the Rome
Statute. As Judge Jackman noted in Caesar, and the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee affirmed, "good faith compliance is of even greater importance in
the area of international human rights law, where what is at stake is not the
impersonal interests of states but the protection of the fundamental rights of the
208
individual. ,
This attempt to avoid certain obligations under the Statute also implicates
Article 44 of the Vienna Convention, which concerns "separability of treaty
provisions. 2 9 Whether withdrawal of a referral is seen as a state party's
violation of the basic referral procedure, the admissibility or jurisdiction
procedural requirements, or the other obligations to cooperate with the Court, in
any sense withdrawal would be a state party's attempt to selectively apply the
rules of the Rome Statute. According to Article 44 of the Vienna Convention,
however, if a treaty provides a party the right to "denounce, withdraw from or
suspend the operation of the treaty" (as the Rome Statute does in Articles 121
and 127), a party may take such action only vis-a-vis the whole treaty and not
204
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with respect "solely to particular clauses."21 Withdrawal does not meet the
exceptions to Article 44: state party referral and cooperation are integral to the
treaty as a whole,2 1' and as such they are essential bases for other states parties
consenting to participate in the 'Court.2 12 Continued performance of the
remainder of the treaty would be manifestly unjust and effectively impossible,2 13
at least with respect to that state party. There is no justification under this article
for a state party to the Rome Statute to suspend part of its obligations by
withdrawing its referral.
Finally, the Vienna Convention allows for recourse to "the preparatory work
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion" as a supplemental means
of interpretation where the treaty leaves the meaning of any terms "ambiguous
or obscure. ' 214 The ordinary meaning of the Rome Statute is fairly clear for the
purposes of this discussion, but an examination of the draft history, together
with the finished Statute, overwhelmingly conveys that the drafters intended to
preserve the strong jurisdiction of the Court once exercised and bind states
parties to their obligations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The drafting history of the Rome Statute, like the Statute itself, does not
address unilateral withdrawal of referrals, contains no discussion of withdrawal,
and makes no allowance for withdrawal of a referral. Looking to comparable
international practice, the IACtHR has recognized a unilateral withdrawal of a
referral by the Inter-American Commission, within the very narrow temporal
window between when a referral is made to the Court and when the Court
actually exercises its jurisdiction over that case or referral. This limited possibility
for withdrawal logically translates to the ICC, given the similar procedural
regimes of the two courts. The Prosecutor of the ICC has no reason not to
recognize this very limited form of withdrawal, considering the flexibility and
versatility that the Prosecutor has shown with the Rome Statute to date. This
recognition does not diminish the power or the nature of the Court and may
reassure those states already wary of the powers and independence of the Court
and its Prosecutor.
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Outside of this narrow exception, international practice, especially in the
context of treaties designed to protect human rights, counsels against
recognition of a State's right to unilaterally withdraw a referral even in the
absence of explicit provisions in a treaty prohibiting such a withdrawal. This
practice translates directly to the circumstances of the ICC, which was set up to
protect human rights and to punish the most egregious abusers of those rights,
but which also fails to explicitly prohibit withdrawal of a referral once the Court
has taken full jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the role of the ICC does not change in the face of an attempted
withdrawal. The same issues of sovereignty, complementarity, and "peace versus
justice" exist; the individual circumstances of a given situation must still be
delicately considered; and the universal obligation to prosecute certain crimes
remains. g5 More importantly, an attempted withdrawal of a referral does not
unavoidably truncate a case, foreclose all other options, or immediately require
an abandonment of cooperation. Current and former members of the OTP have
privately expressed that they would regard an attempted withdrawal simply as a
challenge to admissibility or an invocation of complementarity, which is a
reasonable alternative interpretation of a given State's desire to withdraw a
referral.
While it is clear that withdrawal of a referral is not currently a viable option
under the Rome Statute, there is at least one good reason to favor establishing a
limited withdrawal option. The Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") and the
Central African Republic ("CAR") made nearly identical referrals to the ICC.
Rather than submitting a detailed referral that "specif[ied] the relevant
circumstances" and was accompanied by "supporting documentation, ' '216 both
states referred to the Prosecutor "the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court ... committed anywhere in the territory [of the referring State]
'
since ... entry into force of the Rome Statute."217
Both states have therefore
relinquished broad, open-ended, unrestricted jurisdiction to the ICC, from now
until eternity.
The DRC and CAR presumably do not want the ICC's jurisdiction
"triggered" forever; this would be an affront to notions of complementarity and
sovereignty. Given that the Prosecutor has worked closely and successfully with
states parties to create the self-referral phenomenon, he should similarly work
J
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with states to negotiate the termination or withdrawal of referrals, where
appropriate. This is consistent with the Prosecutor's cooperative, non-adversarial
approach to policy at the ICC. Even states that make well-defined, limited selfreferrals may eventually want to re-exert control and jurisdiction over the
situation, at the conclusion of wars or conflicts, after succession of governments,
et cetera. Similarly, the Rome Statute does not define how or when a non-state
party's Article 12(3) declaration terminates. Does the "rebuttable presumption"
of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention apply, or is the non-state party bound to
the same withdrawal procedure as states parties under Article 127 of the Rome
Statute? The Ivory Coast made its declaration to the Court using very similar
language as the DRC and CAR state party referrals. Presumably, the Ivory Coast
also wants to reclaim jurisdiction eventually.
As the seventh anniversary of the Rome Statute's entry into force
approaches, the Prosecutor should work with the Assembly of States Parties and
the UN to define these confusing concepts and to address them in amendments
to the Court's Statute or Rules. The issues surrounding withdrawal of referrals
affect all states parties, the basic functioning of the ICC, and ultimately,
therefore, the protection of human rights and the prosecution of the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community.
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